Why general artificial intelligence will not be realized
agiartificial-intelligencephilosophydreyfustacit-knowledgeembodied-cognition
Abstraction: HN debate over Dreyfus-style philosophical arguments that AGI is impossible
Key points:
- The article (published in Nature subsidiary journal) revives Hubert Dreyfus' argument: computers are "not in the world" and lack the embodied, tacit knowledge required for general intelligence
- Majority of HN commenters argue that deep learning systems demonstrably possess tacit knowledge (pattern recognition without explicit rules), undermining the key Dreyfus premise
- Counter-analogy: just as pre-Wright-Brothers arguments that flight was impossible missed the point, claiming AGI is impossible from current absence conflates hard with impossible
- A Berkeley student who took Dreyfus' course explains his Heideggerian "dasein" framing — meaning arises from webs of inter-relationships; computers are the hammer, not the agent
- Distinction drawn between "AGI is very hard" (uncontroversial) vs. "AGI is impossible in principle" (the strong claim, which most find unsupported)
- Article considered poor quality for a Nature publication; several commenters note it ignores Dennett, avoids defining key terms, and confuses symbolic AI limitations with all computation
Connections: Hubert Dreyfus · Artificial General Intelligence · Tacit Knowledge · Embodied Cognition