Towards Understanding Safety Alignment: A Mechanistic Perspective from Safety Neurons

Zijun Yao (Tsinghua University, Tsinghua University) · Yushi Bai (Tsinghua University) · Lei Hou (Tsinghua University, Tsinghua University) · Juanzi Li (Tsinghua University, Tsinghua University) · Jianhui Chen (Tsinghua University) · Xiaozhi Wang (Tsinghua University)
activation patternsalignment taxcausal effectsdynamic activation patchinggenerative modelshelpfulnessinference-time activation contrastingmechanistic interpretabilitymodel safetyred-teaming benchmarkssafety alignmentsafety neuronssafety performanceunsafe outputs

Large language models (LLMs) excel in various capabilities but pose safety risks such as generating harmful content and misinformation, even after safety alignment. In this paper, we explore the inner mechanisms of safety alignment through the lens of mechanistic interpretability, focusing on identifying and analyzing safety neurons within LLMs that are responsible for safety behaviors. We propose inference-time activation contrasting to locate these neurons and dynamic activation patching to evaluate their causal effects on model safety. Experiments on multiple prevalent LLMs demonstrate that we can consistently identify about 5% safety neurons, and by only patching their activations we can restore over 90% of the safety performance across various red-teaming benchmarks without influencing general ability. The finding of safety neurons also helps explain the ''alignment tax'' phenomenon by revealing that the key neurons for model safety and helpfulness significantly overlap, yet they require different activation patterns for the same neurons. Furthermore, we demonstrate an application of our findings in safeguarding LLMs by detecting unsafe outputs before generation.